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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendants George Quist ("Quist") and S.N.L. 
Financial Corporation ("SNL") agree with the Statement 
of Jurisdiction provided by Plaintiff Giles H. Florence 
("Florence"). In further support thereof, Defendants 
note that the Summary Judgment from which this Appeal 
was taken, was entered by the Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson of the Third District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah on May 30, 1990. Florence's 
Notice of Appeal was timely filed on June 14, 1990. 
Record at 000101. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Defendants disagree with Plaintiff's Statement of 
Issues and Standard of Review (Brief at pp. 1-3) and 
submit that the sole issue presented by this Appeal can 
be succinctly distilled to the following: 
Whether the Lower Court Erred in Granting 
Defendants• Motion for Summary Judgment? 
Inherently contained within this issue are the 
following sub-issues: 
A. Did the trial court properly construe the 
Letter and the Release, both dated May 31, 
1984, in its determination that the release 
became effective releasing Defendants from any 
liability for payment of a commission? 
B, In construing the April 22, 1983 Letter, did 
the Trial Court properly determine that 
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Plaintiff was not entitled to any brokerage 
commission? 
C. In so construing the documents, was there any 
issue of fact, both material and necessary to 
the decision, which was truly placed in 
dispute, by the submissions made to the lower 
court? 
Defendants submit that the correct Standard of 
Review is as follows: 
In considering an appeal from a grant of summary 
judgment, the Appellate Court views the facts in a light 
most favorable to the losing party below. And in 
determining whether those facts require as a matter of 
law, the entry of judgment for the prevailing party 
below, the Appellate Court gives no deference to the 
Trial Court's Conclusions of Law which are reviewed for 
correctness. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 
P.2d 634 (Utah 1989) . 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Defendants submit that the interpretation of the 
following Statutes and Rules are determinative: 
1) Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-2(8), (1953, as amended) 
(Addendum F). 
2) Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-18, (1953, as amended) 
(Addendum F). 
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3) Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(Addendum F). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, 
On April 19, 1985, Florence filed a Complaint 
against SNL and Quist, initiating the underlying action 
which culminated in this appeal. Florence's Complaint 
alleges that SNL and Quist are in breach of a contract 
to pay him a commission. (Record at 00004). 
B. The Course of Proceedings. 
Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, 
requesting dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint. Counsel 
for both parties submitted memoranda to and participated 
in oral argument on Defendants' Motion before Judge 
Wilkinson. The Trial Court granted Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
C. Disposition at Trial Court. 
Defendants dispute the claim of ambiguities 
contained in Plaintiff's statement of the case. The 
Trial Court did not determine that there were any 
ambiguities. (Record at 00107, pp. 1-7, Addendum E) . 
The Court granted Defendants' Motion and determined as a 
matter of law that the Letter and Release both dated 
May 31, 1984 were effective, thereby releasing 
Defendants from any liability for payment of a 
commission. (Record at 00107, p. 2, Addendum E) . 
-3-
Although not necessary to its decision, the Court 
further determined as a matter of law that the 
handwritten letter of April 22, 1983 was insufficient to 
entitle Plaintiff to receive a commission. (Record at 
00107, p. 4, Addendum E). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants dispute Plaintiff's Statement of Facts 
(Brief at pp. 3-6) and submit that the undisputed facts 
are as follows: 
1. During 1982, David B. Johnson, who owned 
approximately 62% of Security International Corporation, 
was seeking a buyer or merger candidate for his 
interest. Security International Corporation was a 
holding company which owned 100% of the stock of 
Security International Insurance Company. Johnson 
Deposition (4-30-90) at pp. 11-12, Addendum A ) . 
2. On January 27, 1983, Plaintiff Giles Florence, 
called Mr. Johnson on the telephone from Hawaii. During 
the course of their conversation, Mr. Johnson related 
that he was possibly interested in a merger candidate if 
Mr. Florence knew of anyone who could possibly fit into 
the Security International Insurance Company 
organization. Johnson Deposition (4-30-90) at p. 14, 
Addendum A. 
3. Thereafter, Florence and Johnson entered into 
-4-
an option to purchase or sell, Johnson Deposition (4-
30-90) at pp. 16-18, Addendum A. 
4. On or about April 22, 1983, Defendant George 
Quist as President of Defendant SNL submitted through 
Plaintiff a preliminary handwritten offer to purchase 
Johnson's interest in Security International 
Corporation. Record at 00080, Addendum B. 
5. Following receipt of the April 22, 1983, 
handwritten offer by Johnson, a series of 
correspondence, proposals and counter-proposals Were 
exchanged between the Defendants and the proposed 
Seller, or their respective counsel, relating to 
Defendant SNL's purchase of Johnson's interest in 
Security International Corporation. Johnson Deposition 
(4-30-90) at p. 26, Addendum A. 
6. On May 31, 1984, the parties met in the office 
of Mr. Johnson's attorney in North Dakota. Mr. Florence 
was also present. At that time, a letter agreement was 
executed by Defendant Quist, as President of Defendant 
SNL which set forth certain payments to be made to GH3 
National Corporation "after closing of the transaction 
whereby Security International Insurance Company is 
acquired by SNL Financial Corporation." Record at 
00044, Addendum C. 
7. Concurrent therewith and "in consideration of" 
the letter of the same date from Defendant George R. 
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Quist, President of Defendant SNL Financial Corporation, 
Plaintiff Giles Florence executed a release and 
discharge of all liability of Defendants SNLf Quist, and 
additional entities named therein. Record at 00046, 
Addendum D. 
8. The following day, on June 1, 1984, Defendant 
SNL, through its president Defendant Quist, reached an 
impasse with Johnson regarding the purchase of Johnson's 
interest in Security International Corporation. 
9. Thereafter, up through June 28, 1984, Florence 
continued to make efforts to produce a buyer for 
Johnson's interest in SIC. Johnson Deposition, (4-30-
90) at p. 118, Addendum A. 
10. On June 28, 1984, Johnson received an offer 
from a third party to purchase Johnson's interest in 
SIC, which offer was accepted; and the transaction was 
closed on October 10, 1984. Johnson Deposition (4-30-
90) at p. 119, Addendum A. 
11. On July 19, 1984, Plaintiff Florence and 
Johnson and the latter's corporations executed mutual 
releases each to the other. Addendum G. 
12. The transaction described in the May 31, 1984 
letter of Defendant Quist to GH3 National Corporation 
was never concluded and the sale of Johnson's interest 
to Defendant SNL referred to therein never closed and no 
commission was paid by Defendants. 
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13. Before trial, Defendants filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment of Dismissal, which motion was granted 
by the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, District Judge. 
Record at 00035 and 00097-98. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
No facts were presented to the Trial Court that 
Plaintiff was entitled to any commission. In fact, the 
undisputed evidence as contained in the May 31, 1984 
Letter and Release demonstrate that Plaintiff expressly 
agreed that any, would be paid to a third party, who is 
not a party to the instant action. Even assuming 
arguendo that a commission became owing, it was not 
owing to Plaintiff. In addition, the lower court was 
not presented with any evidence that Plaintiff was, or 
is, a licensed real estate broker. Under such 
circumstances, Plaintiff is precluded from maintaining 
the instant action against these Defendants, pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated § 61-2-18, (1953, as amended) 
(Addendum F). 
The undisputed evidence showed that the April 22, 
1983 handwritten letter was superseded through various 
exchanges, proposals and counter-offers and that the 
May 31, 1984 Letter and Release constituted the final 
agreement between the parties. The court further 
correctly determined that the approval of the May 31, 
1984 letter by attorney, Joseph L. Henriod had no 
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bearing whatsoever as far as the situation was concerned 
between the parties. Therefore, the May 31, 1984 letter 
was not invalid for failure of a condition precedent, 
and the Release was effective, thereby releasing 
Defendants from any liability for payment of a 
commission. 
Finally, the Trial Court correctly determined that 
the April 22, 1983 Letter was insufficient under the 
Statute of Frauds, even assuming that said Letter was 
applicable. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO ANY COMMISSION. 
A. No Commission Was to be Paid Plaintiff. 
No evidence exists that Plaintiff is entitled to 
any commission. In fact, the only evidence before the 
Trial Court demonstrates that a third party, and not 
Plaintiff, was to receive a commission, if any. The 
May 31, 19 84 Letter and Release expressly states that 
the commission, if any became owing, was to be paid to 
GH3, a corporation. GH3 is not a party to this action. 
B. Plaintiff is Not a Licensed Broker. 
Plaintiff has argued extensively that he is 
entitled to a "brokerage" fee or a commission because he 
brought a willing seller and a willing buyer together 
involving a sale of real property. However, there is 
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neither any allegation in Plaintiff's Complaint nor any 
evidence before the Court that Plaintiff was or is a 
licensed broker. Utah Code Annotated § 61-2-18, (1953, 
as amended) (Addendum F) prohibits any action, such as 
the instant one, for the recovery of any commission, 
which is brought by anyone other than a licensed broker. 
Therefore, should this Court determine that the 
transaction complained of involved real estate as 
defined by Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-2(8), 1953, as amended) 
(Addendum F), Plaintiff would not be entitled' to 
recover. 
C. Statute of Frauds. 
This Court has held that the Statute of Frauds 
applies to "agreements requiring compensation for 
brokering real estate, including finder's agreement...." 
Machan Hampshire v. Western Real Estate, 779 P.2d 230, 
234 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). It has further held that "a 
broker must allege and prove an express written contract 
to recover a commission." Jd. Finally, this Court 
held, in C.J. Realty, Inc. v. Willey, 758 P.2d 923, 928 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), that in order for a brokerage 
agreement or contract to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, 
it must include the following critical terms: 
1) It must identify the finder; 
2) It must identify the finder's client; 
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3) It must identify the property owner who will 
owe a commission to the finder if the 
transaction is closed with the finder's 
client; and 
4) It must identify the finder's commission rate. 
Neither the May 31, 1984 Letter and Release, nor 
the April 22, 1983 letter (assuming it were applicable), 
contains the critical terms necessary to satisfy the 
Statute of Frauds. Therefore, the lower court's 
determination that the Statute of Frauds applies to' the 
transaction at issue is correct. (Record at 00107, pp. 
4-5) (Addendum E). 
Since Plaintiff is not a licensed broker and since 
neither of the vritten agreements between the parties 
satisfies the Statute of Frauds, this Court should 
affirm the Order of Summary Judgment granted below. 
II. 
NO COMMISSION IS DDE BY VIRTUE OF THE 
MAY 31, 1984 LETTER AND RELEASE. 
A. The April 22, 1983 Letter was Superseded by the 
May 31, 1984 Letter and Release. 
In Verhoef v. Aston, 740 P.2d 1342, 1344 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987), this Court held that "contracts should be 
construed so as to give effect to the parties' 
intentions, and such intent should be determined, if 
possible, by examining the written Agreement executed by 
the parties." (citing Atlas Corp. v. Clovis National 
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Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987)). When agreements 
are executed "substantially contemporaneously and are 
clearly interrelated, they must be construed as a whole 
and harmonized, if possible." Atlas Corp. v. Clovis 
National Bank, at 229. 
In this case, it is undisputed that subsequent to 
the letter dated April 22, 1983, a series of 
correspondence, proposals and counter-proposals were 
exchanged between the Defendants and Seller, or their 
counsel, relating to SNL's purchase of Johnson's 
interest in SIC. It is further undisputed that the 
May 31, 1984 Letter and Release, which were executed in 
conjunction with each other, were intended to be and did 
in fact constitute the final agreement between the 
parties. As such, all prior negotiations and 
agreements, including the April 22, 1983 letter, merged 
into the May 31, 1984 Letter and Release which must be 
construed as a whole. See Verhoef v. Aston, at 1344 ("A 
basic tenet of contract law is that prior negotiations 
and agreements merge into the final written agreement on 
the subject.") 
Based upon the undisputed facts, Defendants submit 
that the Trial Court correctly determined, as a matter 
of law, that the parties reduced their final agreement 
to the Letter and the Release, both dated May 31, 1984. 
(Record at 00107, p. 5) (Addendum E). 
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B. The Letter Conditioned Payment of a Commission Upon 
Closing. 
The right to the receipt of a commission can be 
waived, (White v. Fox, 665 P.2d 1297, 1302 (Utah 1983)), 
or conditioned upon the buyer's performance Robert 
Langston, Ltd. v. McQuarrie, 741 P.2d 554, 558 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987). As such there is no absolute right to a 
commission. 
In this case, the May 31, 1984 letter specifically 
conditions the payment of any commission upon the 
transaction closing. Therefore, the Trial Court 
correctly determined, as a matter of law, that no 
commission was due inasmuch as the closing never 
occurred. (Record at 00107, pp. 2-3, 5-6) (Addendum E). 
C. The May 31, 1984 Release is Effective and is Not 
Defeated by Plaintiff's Allegation of a Failure of 
a Condition Precedent. 
As his only defense to the May 31, 1984 Release, 
which he executed, Plaintiff alleges that it did not 
take effect because the May 31, 1984 Letter was to have 
been approved by attorney, Joseph L. Henriod. However, 
Mr. Henriod's approval of the Letter had no bearing 
whatsoever on the transaction contemplated between 
Plaintiff and Defendants which was dealing with an 
entirely separate issue, did not form an essential part 
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of the bargain and had nothing to do with the Release 
becoming effective. Rather, the clause was inserted to 
ensure that the Court•s Order in Florence•s divorce 
proceeding was complied with. 
In addition, Plaintiff's allegation is not well 
founded in law. Plaintiff, at page 24 of his Brief, has 
cited Welch Transfer and Storage, Inc. v. Oldham, 663 
P.2d 73 (Utah 1983), in support of his position. 
However, his reliance on Welch is misplaced. In Welchf 
the Plaintiff brought an action for breach of a contract 
to exchange real properties on the condition that the 
Small Business Administration approve reciprocal 
assumption by each party of the Small Business 
Administration loan to the other. When the reciprocal 
assumption was not accomplished, the Trial Court 
concluded that the contract could not be enforced due to 
failure of mutual conditions. Welch at 76. On appeal, 
the Court did not conclude that no contract existed, as 
Plaintiff argues, but held that "the contract expired by 
its own terms." Id. 
Here there was no necessity for any action by Mr. 
Henriod, because the transaction never closed. 
Plaintiff has not, nor can he demonstrate any 
prejudice which he may have suffered as a result of Mr. 
Henriod's not reviewing the letter, although an argument 
might be made that Mr. Henriod's failure to disapprove 
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the letter was tantamount to at least tacit approval of 
the same. 
III. 
ALLEGED AMBIGUITY OF THE APRIL 22, 1983 LETTER. 
Finally, beginning at page 9 of his Brief, 
Plaintiff alleges that the lower rourt determined the 
April 22, 1983, Letter to be ambiguous as a matter of 
law. Such an allegation is completely false and is a 
gross misrepresentation of Judge Wilkinson's ruling. 
(Record at 00107, pp. 1-6) (Addendum E) . The court 
never found or held that the April 22, 1983, Letter was 
ambiguous. Indeed, the transcript of the Judge's bench 
ruing (Record at 00107) (Addendum E) is void of any 
reference to any ambiguity. Rather, the trial court 
found that the April 22, 1983, Letter was insufficient 
as a brokerage agreement to satisfy that a commission 
would be paid under the Statute of Frauds, and that 
essential terms for the payment of a commission were 
missing. (Record at 00107 pp. 4-5) (Addendum E). 
Plaintiff has apparently attempted to create an 
issue of ambiguity in hopes of using the parol evidence 
rule to defeat Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
However, "parol evidence will not be considered in 
construing a contract unless there is ambiguity in the 
final document and other contemporaneous writings on the 
same subject." Verhoef v. Aston, at 1344. There being 
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no evidence of any ambiguity, all of Plaintiff's 
arguments relative thereto must fail. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants submit that the undisputed facts 
demonstrate that Plaintiff is not entitled to prevail on 
this appeal. There is no issue of material fact on 
which a trial is necessary and Defendants were and are 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, 
this Court should affirm the Trial Court's Order 
Granting Summary Judgment against Plaintiff and in favor 
of Defendants. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J3>*f day of fflg 
1991. _ 
<S ^ g W W gL 
Arthur H.^ /Niels en 
Larry L. Whyte 
of Nielsen & Senior, P.C 
Counsel for Appellees 
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I hereby certify that pursuant to Rule 26(b), Utah 
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four (4) copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE APPELLEES, 
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Anthony M. Thurber, Esq. 
Suite 735, Judge Building 
8 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
-15 
ADDENDUM 
ADDENDUM 
CONTENTS 
A. David Johnson Deposition, pp. 11-12, 14, 16-18, 26, 
118 and 119 
B. April 22, 1983 Letter 
C. May 31, 1984 Letter 
D. May 31, 1984 Release 
E. Transcript of Judge Homer F. Wilkinson's Bench 
Ruling 
F. Section 61-2-2(8), U.C.A. (1953, as amended) 
Section 61-2-18, U.C.A. (1953, as amended) 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
G. Exhibit 8 to David B. Johnson's Deposition 
ADDENDUM A 
1 IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
2 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
STATE OF UTAH 
3 
4 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
5 GILES FLORENCE, 
6 Plaintiff, 
7 VS. Civil No. 850902501 CV 
8 S.N.L. FINANCIAL CORPORATION, 
GEORGE QUIST, 
9 
10 Defendants. 
11 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
12 
13 
14 D E P O S I T I O N 
15 OF 
16 DAVID B. JOHNSON 
17 April 30, 1990 
18 10:00 o'clock, a.m. 
19 
Taken at: 
20 Offices of VOGEL, BRANTNER, KELLY, 
KNUTSON, WEIR & BYE, LTD. 
21 502 First Avenue North 
Fargo, North Dakota 
22 
23 
24 REPORTER: LISA SICKLER, RPR 
25 (PURSUANT TO NOTICE) 
DOUG KETCHAM & ASSOCIATES 
Box 3165, Fargo, N.D. 58108, (701)237-0275 
1 A P P E A R A N C E S 
2 
3 
ANTHONY M. THURBER 
4 Attorney at Law 
Suite 735, Judge Building 
5 8 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
6 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF 
7 
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN 
8 Attorney at Law 
of 
9 NIELSEN & SENIOR 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
10 36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
11 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS 
12 
Also present: Kermit Bye 
13 Giles FLorence 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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11 
1 had a contract that called -to-r—g^tiewaiy for 
2 renewals. 
3 Q. And were those contracts calling 
4 for renewals to agents who had done the 
5 production obligations of Security 
6 International Insurance Company that existed 
7 regardless of changes of the ownership of the 
8 company? 
9 A- Yes. 
10 Q. Did there come a time during 1982 
11 or 1983 that you decided upon seeking a buyer 
12 for your position? 
13 A. A buyer or a merger candidate, 
14 yes. 
15 Q. Were there reasons that you made 
16 that decision? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. What were they? 
19 A. I had felt that the insurance 
20 industry had been in the decade or more of 
21 change and that we didn't have the resources 
22 or the management to truly expand the company 
23 as I would have liked to expand it and I 
24 thought we needed assistance or help in that 
25 endeavor. 
DOUG KETCHAM & ASSOCIATES 
Box 3165, Fargo, M.D. 58108, (701)237-0275 
1 Q. Did the health condition of your 
2 wife have any play, any role in that? 
3 A, Yes, that was another reason. 
4 Q. In any event, by the year, 
5 sometime during the year 1982 had you made 
6 that decision to seek a buyer or merger? 
7 A. Yes, yes. 
8 Q. Was there other change in the 
9 deposit or surplus requirements in Minnesota 
10 that played any role in your decision? 
11 A. That was one of the reasons also. 
12 Minnesota had dramatically increased its 
13 capital and surplus requirements and although 
14 Security International Insurance Company had 
15 been profitable several years prior to this 
16 increase or the mandatory increase deadline 
17 date, we were still far short of the new 
18 requirements because of the dramatic increase 
19 in the demands of the state of Minnesota. 
20 Q. So were you faced with the 
21 necessity of raising some additional surplus 
22 or making a deposit in Minnesota by a certain 
23 date as a condition? 
24 A. Conditional capital and surplus, 
25 that's correct. 
DOUG KETCHAM & ASSOCIATES 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
references. And on January 27, 1983 Giles 
Florence who had been active in merger work 
called me from Hawaii. And during the course 
of the conversation I related that I was 
possibly interested in a merger candidate if 
he knew of anyone who could possibly fit into 
Security International Insurance Company. 
Q. By that time had you determined 
what price would be acceptable for your 
position? 
A. Well, Buchanan had given us a 
formula that came up with a ball park 
figure. It really boiled down to the capital 
and surplus and mandatory security valuation 
reserves T«^ plus a price or value for the 
business. And so we had a general idea of 
what the company was worth and could be sold 
to about anyone in the market for a, what we 
considered a well-run company. 
Q. For a profitable life insurance 
company at that time was there more than one 
buyer out at the marketplace? 
A. Oh, yes, there were numerous 
buyers throughout the country that would be 
interested in buying ours. 
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1 what's been marked Exhibit 1 and ask if you 
2 can identify that. 
3 A. Yes, this is the agreement that I 
4 had with Mr, Florence. 
5 Q. All right. It's not too legible 
6 so I will read along and you correct me if I 
7 misread any of this, will you, please? 
8 A. Yes . 
9 Q. The caption appears to be option 
10 to purchase or sell. For $10 and other 
11 valuable consideration — 
12 MR. NIELSEN: Objection. Can you 
13 start with the, apparently what appears to be 
14 a date I can't read. 
15 Q. (BY MR- THURBER) The date, what 
16 does the date appear to be? 
17 A. It's cut off on the top of this 
18 also. It looks, however, like April. I 
19 can't tell what the next number is, 19, I 
20 believe it says '82, but it's really — 
21 MR. FLORENCE: That's right. 
22 It's 1982. But I don't know the date 
23 there. Is it 1? 
24 MR. THURBER: Let's let David 
2 5
 testify. 
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1 A. I can't tell by the --
2 Q. (BY MR- THURBER) April 
3 something. 
4 A. That is correct. It looks like 
5 April 1 or 9th or something in 1982, 
6 Q. Okay. And then is the following, 
7 the text of this document, "For $10 and 
8 other valuable consideration the undersigned 
9 grants this option to Giles H. Florence to 
10 buy my control of SIC, a holding company, 
11 which owns 100 percent of SIIC, statements 
12 attached. 
13 The undersigned will accept 
14 $2,800,000 cash or a reasonable figure above 
15 this cash figure or a payout with the right 
16 buyer. 
17 It is the intention of the seller 
18 to have you raise $1,000,000 new capital for 
19 SIIC at the request of Minnesota Insurance 
20 Department new rules for capital 
21 requirements. This will enable us to expand 
22 our bank insurance business. However, I will 
23 accept a qualified sale for my control. 
24 This option expires upon sale and 
25 closing. In witness thereof, the parties 
DOUG KETCHAM & ASSOCIATES 
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1 have executed and delivered this agreement on 
2 the day and year first above written. 
3 Signed acceptable to Giles H. Florence and as 
4 seller Security International Corporation by 
5 yourself as president.M Is that what it 
6 says? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. And was that your agreement at 
9 that time? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 MR. NIELSEN: What about the 
12 notation in the lower right-hand corner. 
13 Would you mind asking Mr. Johnson if that is 
14 part of the agreement? 
15 A. I can't read that. 
16 MR. THURBER: Let's go off the 
17 record for a moment. 
18 (Discussion held off the record.) 
19 A, No, I don't. 
20 Q. (BY MR. TMJRBER) The question was 
21 are you aware of that tiny notation in the 
22 lower right-hand corner being on the 
2 3 original? 
24 A. No. I can't read it and I don't 
25 recall it. 
DOUG KETCHAM & ASSOCIATE 
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1 Q. (BY MR- THURBER) Was there ever 
2 any consideration or agreement on your part 
3 to pay as commission anything to Mr. Florence 
4 or his company for efforts in putting 
5 together a sale? 
5 A. No. I was clear with Mr. Florence 
7 that any fees that he expected to receive 
8 were to come from the buyer. 
9 Q. And was that so from the very 
10 beginning? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. Following your receipt of the 
13 handwritten proposal that appears as Exhibit 
14 2, did there follow a series of exchanges of 
15 correspondence and proposals and 
16 counterproposals that finally resulted in an 
17 agreement? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. And did those exchanges include 
20 what appears in Exhibit 3 which is actually 
21 two items of correspondence on S.N.L. 
22 Financial letterhead April 25 and May 11, 
23 1983? 
24 MR. NIELSEN: Just a moment before 
25 you answer. Just let me check. My Exhibit 
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anything. 
Q. Have you ever asked? 
A. I haven't asked for anything. 
Q. Do you have any expectation? 
A. Well, if I am as d to go to t^ial 
out in Salt Lake City, I would expect 
expenses, but I truly doubt whether I could 
leave Fargo with the condition of my wife. 
Q. Beyond expenses, actual 
out-of-pocket expenses do you require 
anything? 
A. No. 
Q. Is it true — well, let me ask it 
this way, did Mr. Florence continue even 
after the failure of the Quist transaction to 
close, did Mr. Florence continue to make 
efforts to produce a buyer? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But the buyer who was produced and 
who finally did close was not one produced by 
Mr. Florence? 
A. He was not, yes. 
Q. How long after the failure of the 
Quist transaction on June 1, 1984 was it that 
you reached agreement with the new buyer? 
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A. They made an offer on June 28, 
1984 . 
Q. And was the transaction closed on 
the terms of the offer? 
A. It was, yes. And that was 
concluded on October 10 of '84 because a new 
hearing was necessitated in Bismarck, North 
Dakota. 
Q. So when you made the agreement or 
signed the agreement that's marked Exhibit 8 
with Mr. Florence on July 19 of 1984, did you 
know at that time that you had a sale to the 
new buyer? 
A. What agreement was that? 
Q. That's the Exhibit 8 agreement 
regarding Mr. Florence's costs and 
expenses. 
A. Well, I certainly would have known 
that and Giles also knew we had made another 
agreement. 
Q. And had you informed Giles of the 
new agreement you made with the new buyer? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you tell him to just 
discontinue his efforts to find another 
DOUG KETCHAM & ASSOCIATES 
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ADDENDUM C 
Hay 3 1 , 1984 
;H3 N a t i o n a l Corpo ra t i on 
1920 P a r a d i s e Road 
Las Vegas, Nevada 89119 
Gentlemen: 
Dpon the closing of the transaction described below, S.N.L. 
Lnancial Corporation agrees -to pay your company $50,000, 
ash plus $2,500 a month for fifty (50) consecutive months 
ommencing 31 days after closing of the transaction whereby 
ecurity International Insurance Company is acquired by 
•N.L* Financial Corporation. The $50,000 is to be paid 
t the closing of said transaction. Such payment shall be 
n full satisfaction of any and all claims of any kind or 
ature whether arising before or after the date hereof 
gainst S.N.L. Financial Corporation, Security National Life, 
ecurity Holding Corporation, Security International Corpora-
ion, Security International Insurance Company, Northwest 
ales Co., George Quist or David Johnson. 
his agreement is subject to approval of Mr. Joseph Henroid 
£ the law firm of Nielson and Senior of Salt Lake City, 
tah, particularly in regard to that certain court order of 
^proximately October, 1983, regarding the divorce of Giles H. 
ftd Ululani Florence. 
•N.L. Financial Corporation 
George
 <R. £uist 
President 
coo \ i 
ADDENDUM D 
RELEASE 
I, Giles H. Florence, in consideration of a letter dated 
May 31, 1984, from Mr. George R. Quist, President of S.N.L. 
Financial Corporation, hereby agree to release and forever 
discharge all of the following corporations and persons from 
any further liability relating to the matters described in the 
letter referred to herein: 
S.N.L. Financial Corporation 
Security National Life 
Security Holding Corporation 
Security International Corporation 
Security International Insurance Company 
Northwest Sales Co. 
George R. Quist 
David Johnson 
This release is given this 31st day of May, 1984. 
C/fedu.<&jg 
Giles H. Florence 
ADDENDUM E 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
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^ —-T'Ti^ 
GILES FLORENCE, 
Plaintiff, D::po.. ^ .ark 
S.N.L. FINANCIAL CORP., 
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Case No. 850902501 
: Transcript of 
JUDGEfS BENCH RULING 
on MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 
Friday, May 18, 1990 
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For the Defendant 
ANTHONY M. THURBER 
Attorney at Law 
8 East Broadway, #735 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN 
Attorney at Law 
36 South State St., #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
REPORTER: SUZANNE WARNICK, CSR, RPR-CM 
Official Court Reporter 
240 East 400 South, #534 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
801-535-5479 
1 FRIDAY, MAY 18, 1990; A.M. SESSION 
2 J U D G E ' S B E N C H R U L I N G 
3 
4 THE COURT: Counsel, I do want to give you my 
5 decision at this time. 
6 Let me indicate to you that I spent 
7 considerable time going over your memorandums and 
8 affidavits, the applicable law. I guess the only thing 
9 I haven't seen is the Form A of which has been referred 
10 to here today and which substantiates the position that 
11 the Court has while the Court was looking at this. 
12 First of all, let me indicate to you that I 
13 do think the affidavit of Mr. Florence, as Mr. Nielsen 
14 has pointed out, is flawed with certain material and 
15 statements which would not be admissible in a court of 
16 law. However, there are statements in there that would 
17 be admissible. 
18 But assuming and accepting ail of the 
19 affidavit, and assuming Mr. Thurber's position, this is 
20 a broker situation. And I think his statement of the 
21 law is absolutely correct as far as a broker's 
22 commission is concerned as far as producing an able and 
23 willing buyer. 
24 I first looked at the letter of May 31st and 
25 I the release of the same date. And if the Court accepts 
2 
1 those -- of course I am bound to accept them -- but if I 
2 say they are the final documents, then by their terms, 
3 they state that the money is not due until the 
4 transaction or unless the transaction closes. The 
5 release would come into effect immediately upon the 
6 letter becoming effective. I don't think the release is 
7 effective until the letter — there is no release --
8 there is nothing to be released until the letter becomes 
9 effective really. 
10 And of course that is the law of brokerage, 
11 as Mr. Thurber points out in his brief, that the 
12 commission is due to a broker when he produces that 
13 willing and able buyer unless there are terms contained 
14 within the agreement that makes it otherwise. But I 
15 certainly think that there are terms contained within 
16 the letter of May 31st. So as I say, assuming there was 
17 a brokerage situation, that that would prevent the 
18 commission from being paid. 
19 I don't think -- I am not persuaded that the 
20 approval of Mr. Henroid has any bearing whatsoever as 
21 far as the situation is concerned. It's been pointed 
22 out here today, and I assume that in reading this 
23 yesterday, that when it refers to a divorce situation, 
24 that it had something to do with the payment of money as 
25 far as the divorce and the parties were concerned. So I 
1 
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9 
10 
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don' t think that has any bearing on it. 
Now, again assuming that this is a brokerage 
situation, I go back to the letter of April 22nd and to 
Form 
page 
and o 
A of which has been referred here today. And on 
26, Section 15, the commission and finder's fee --
f course I called Mr. Thurber yesterday and I 
believe he was in touch with Mr, Nielsen as to the 
wordi 
this 
given 
ng of this paragraph 6 — that the Court did feel 
was a critical situation. That the wording was 
to me, and of course as I was able to read it 
myself, which I could not make it all out. 
parag 
of a 
would 
buyer 
that 
I am not persuaded that either the wording in 
raph 6 or the wording in the Form A is sufficient 
brokerage agreement to satisfy that a commission 
be paid upon the broker finding a willing and able 
I don't think it's sufficient writing to meet 
requirement and must be in writing under the 
Statute of Frauds. That it does not spell out anything 
reall 
that 
out. 
y as far as the terms. 
And I know Mr. Thurber argues in his brief 
every particular term doesn't need to be spelled 
And I think that is correct also as far as the 
agreement is concerned. But this one just does not even 
get to the heart of it as far as indicating what is 
going to be done as far as the payment of a finder's, a 
4 
1 brokerage fee. So assuming that everything that 
2 Mr. Thurber says in his argument as far as the affidavit 
3 and as far as this being a brokerage transaction, I 
4 don't think the letter of April 22nd or anything in Form 
5 A says the requirement of the law of the Statute of 
6 Frauds or the requirement as far as what must be in 
7 writing for a brokerage, 
8 Now, I am of the opinion and I so find that 
9 I don't think that this is a brokerage situation, 
10 There is not the sale of real property here. Real 
11 property is being traded or paid for the stock, but this 
12 is not the sale of real property. Therefore, I don't 
13 think that law applies at the outset. 
14 I am of the opinion that the wording in the 
15 April 22nd letter and the Form A is not sufficient to 
16 spell out that anything was going to be paid regardless 
17 of what took place. I think the parties came down to 
18 it, that they did then negotiate, and there may have 
19 been some misunderstanding as far as what was supposed 
20 to be paid by Mr. Florence. They reduced that to 
21 writing as far as the letters of May 31st, the letter of 
22 release of May 31st, I think that's the date, May 31st, 
23 1984. 
24 MR. NIELSEN: Yes, sir. 
25 THE COURT: And in those matters they did 
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spell out 
the closi 
don't thi 
to why th 
that 
ng of 
nk it 
a commission was going to be paid upon 
the transaction, which never closed. I 
's material to this Court in this case as 
is transaction did or did not occur. That may 
be a cause of 
parties, 
material 
! don't thi 
some 
action in another action with other 
of these parties. But I don't think it is 
as far as this particular case is concerned. I 
nk the questions of fact — and I think there 
are questions 
did not t 
said and 
there are 
as far as 
ake p 
what 
of fact as far as what took place or what 
ilace at the time of closing, and what was 
was not said and why it didn't close --
disputes, but I don't think they are material 
this 
So 
the motion of 
1 grant the 
judgment, 
particular case is concerned. 
based on that, the Court does feel that 
the defendant is well taken and would 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Mr . 
MR. 
your 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
court will be 
Nielsen, would you prepare the pleadings. 
NIELSEN: May I prepare an order and 
• Honor, on the motion. 
COURT: Yes. 
THURBER: Thank you. 
COURT: If there are no further questions, 
in recess. 
(This concludes this ruling at 10:15 a.m.) 
* * * 
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STATE OF UTAH 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
> 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, SUZANNE WARNICK, CSR, RPR-CM, do certify 
that I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter, Registered 
Professional Reporter with the Certificate of Merit, and 
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah. 
That at the time and place of the proceedings 
in the foregoing matter, I appeared as the court 
reporter in the Third Judicial District Court, for the 
Honorable Judge Homer F. Wilkinson, and thereat reported 
in stenotype all of the proceedings had therein; 
That thereafter, my said shorthand notes of 
the Judge's Bench Ruling on the Motion for Summary 
Judgment were transcribed by computer into the foregoing 
pages; and that this constitutes a full, true and 
correct transcript of the same. 
WITNESS MY HAND and official seal at Salt Lake 
City, Utah, this 30th day of May, 1990. 
My commission expires 
1 April 1991. 
ADDENDUM F 
61-2-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Associate real estate broker" and "associate broker" means any 
person employed or engaged as an independent contractor by or on behalf 
of a licensed principal real estate broker to perform any act set out in 
Subsection (7) for valuable consideration, who has qualified under the 
provisions of this chapter as a principal real estate broker. 
(2) "Commission" means the Real Estate Commission established un-
der this chapter. 
(3) "Concurrence" means the entities given a concurring role must 
jointly agree for action to be taken. 
(4) "Director" means the director of the Division of Real Estate. 
(5) "Division" means the Division of Real Estate. 
(6) "Executive director" means the director of the Department of Com-
merce 
(7) "Principal real estate broker" and "principal broker" means: 
(a) any person who for another and for valuable consideration, or 
who with the intention or in the expectation or upon the promise of 
receiving or collecting valuable consideration, sells, exchanges, pur-
chases, rents, or leases or negotiates the sale, exchange, purchase, 
rental, or leasing of, or offers or attempts or agrees to negotiate the 
sale, exchange, purchase, rental, or leasing of, or lists or offers or 
attempts or agrees to list, or auctions, or offers or attempts or agrees 
to collect rental for the use of real estate or who advertises, who buys 
or offers to buy, sells or offers to sell, or otherwise deals in options on 
real estate or the improvements thereon or who collects or offers or 
attempts or agrees to collect rental for the use of real estate or who 
advertises or holds himself, itself, or themselves out as engaged in 
the business of selling, exchanging, purchasing, renting, or leasing 
real estate, or assists or directs in the procuring of prospects or the 
negotiation or closing of any transaction which does or is calculated 
to result in the sale, exchange, leasing, or renting of any real estate; 
and 
(b) any person, employed by or on behalf of the owner or owners of 
lots or other parcels of real estate a t a stated salary or upon a com-
mission or upon a salary and commission basis or otherwise to sell 
such real estate or any parts thereof in lots or other parcels and who 
sells, exchanges, or offers or attempts or agrees to negotiate the sale 
or exchange of any such lot or parcel of real estate. 
(8) "Real estate" includes leaseholds and business opportunities involv-
ing real property. 
(9) "Real estate sales agent" and "sales agent" means any person em-
ployed or engaged as an independent contractor by or on behalf of a 
licensed principal real estate broker to perform any act set out in Subsec-
tion (7) for valuable consideration. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 110, § 2; 1925, ch. 79, 
§ 1; 1929, ch. 77, § 1; R.S. 1933, 82-2-2, L. 
1939, ch. 106, § 1; C. 1943, 82-2-2; L. 1963, ch. 
146, § 1; 19S3, ch- 257, § 2; 1985, ch. 162, § 2, 
1987, ch. 73, § 32; 1989, ch. 225, § 87. 
Amendment Notes . — The 1985 amend-
ment substituted "any person" for "all persons" 
at the beginning of Subsection (U(a), inserted 
"associate" in two places in Subsection (2), in 
serted "as an independent contractor" and 
"principal** in Subsection (2), substituted "sales 
agent' for "salesman" in two places in Subsec 
tion (3), inserted "as an independent contrac 
tor" in Subjection (3), added "involving real 
propertv" in Subsection (4), substituted Sub 
section (5) for former Subsection (5) which 
read, ""Business opportunity* means an exist-
ing business, a business and its good will, a 
business franchise, or any combination of 
them", and added Subsections (6) through (9) 
The 1987 amendment alphabetized the defi-
nitions and renumbered the subsections ac-
cordingly, added the present Subsection (8), 
and made minor changes in phraseology and 
punctuation throughout the section 
The 1989 amendment, effective March 14, 
1989, substituted "Department of Commerce" 
for "Department of Business Regulation" in 
Subsection (6) 
61-2-18- Actions for recovery of compensation restricted-
CD No person may bring or maintain an action in any court of this state for 
the recovery of a commission, fee, or compensation for any act done or service 
rendered which is prohibited under this chapter to other than licensed princi-
pal brokers, unless the person was duly licensed as a principal broker at the 
time of the doing of the act or rendering the service. 
(2) No sales agent or associate broker may sue in his own name for the 
recovery of a fee, commission, or compensation for services as a sales agent or 
associate broker unless the action is against the principal broker with whom 
he is or was licensed. Any action for the recovery of a fee, commission, or other 
compensation may only be instituted and brought by the principal broker 
with whom the sales agent or associate broker is affiliated. 
History: C. 1943, 82-2-18, enacted by L. 
1951, ch. 102, § 2; 1983, ch. 257, § 17; 1985, 
ch. 162, § 16. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend-
ment substituted references to principal bro-
kers, sales agents, and associate brokers for 
the recovery of a fee, commission, or other com-
pensation may only be" for "such action shall 
references to principal real estate brokers, real 
estate salesmen, and brokers, respectively; de-
leted "the doing or rendering o r after "ren-
dered" in Subsection (1); added "with whom he 
is or was licensed" at the end of the first sen-
tence of Subsection (2); substituted "action for 
be" in the second sentence of Subsection (2); 
and made minor changes in phraseology. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) Fo r claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) F o r defending par ty . A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
v i t shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
<or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
.of a party opposing the motion tha t he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Compiler ' s Notes . — This rule is similar to Cross-References . — Contempt generally, 
Rule 56, F.R.C.P. §§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 
ADDENDUM G 
MUTUAL RELEASES BY AND BETWEEN GILES FLORENCE, 
DAVID B. JOHNSON, SECURITY INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, 
SECURITY INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 
AND NORTHWEST SALES COMPANY 
This Mutual Release is made and entered into as of this 19th 
ay of July, 1984, by and between GILES FLORENCE, DAVID B. JOHNSON, 
LCURITY INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, SECURITY INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE 
DMPANY, and NORTHWEST SALES COMPANY. 
WHEREAS Giles Florence has provided certain personal services 
D David B. Johnson, Security International Corporation, Security 
iternational Insurance Company, and Northwest Sales Company, and 
WHEREAS Giles Florence has been paid for those personal services 
t least the amount of Twenty-five Thousand Six Hundred Twelve and 
3/100 ($25,612.98) DOLLARS, and such additional sums as may appear /^\ 
i the books and records of either Security International Corporation {)% \ 
nd/or Security International Insurance Company.« between the dates 
f February 1, 1983 and July 19, 1984, and
 f%K/j :j:.~'._-r.::. l\4.S' >^r4''; 
WHEREAS each of the parties to this Release have agreed to settle 
oon all matters and also upon all personal service contracts, written 
r oral, entered into between the parties at any time, up to and 
deluding the date of this release agreement, and by the execution 
£ Mutual Releases in the manner hereinafter appearing: 
NOW THIS INDENTURE WITNESSETH: That pursuant to the said agree-
snt recited and set forth herein and in consideration of the pay-
ant of the sum of at least $25,612.98, plus such additional sums 
s may appear upon the books and records of either Security 
nternational Corporation and/or Security International Insurance 
Drapany, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged 
y Giles Florence, each of the parties to this agreement hereby 
slease the other, their heirs, personal representatives, estates 
nd assigns from all sums of money, accounts, actions, claims and 
srr.ands up to the date and execution of these presents. 
Each of the undersigned hereby declare that no promise or induce-
srvfc has been made or offered for this mutual exchange of releases 
•:cepi as set forth herein; that this mutual exchange of releases 
5 executed without reliance upon any statement or representation 
/ or in behalf of the person or parties released, or their repre-
sntatives; that this release is intended as a discharge of the 
2leasee(s) from any and all further liability to each of the other 
~cersigned •parties for the consequences of said events, including 
11 said loss and damage, both known and unknown, direct and conseq-
uential; that no mistake of fact with respect to the nature or 
xtent of said consequences, or of said loss or damage, shall inv-
alidate or void this Release; and that said consideration is volun-
arily accepted for the purpose of making a full, complete and final 
Vca O^V^S^-
compromise, adjustment and settlement of any and all said claims, 
demands or causes of action, disputed or otherwise. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, each of the parties have hereunto set their 
hands and seals this 19th day of July, 1984. 
- C A U T I O N -
READ BEFORE SIGNING 
_Giles Florence' 
: <^ i iX UV-
David B. Johnson 
SECURITY INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 
David B. Johnson, President 
\ n 
SECURITY INTERN^TXQNAI/ INSURANCE COMPANY 
By. .sci yv-
David B. Johnson A President 
v\ 
NORTHWEST, SALES COMPANY 
<*__,- ; (, • 
By uv'^^__ 
David B. Johnson, President 
